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THE NEGLIGENT RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY: ARE TORT
CLAIMS "COSTS AND EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION"?
Under section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, certain claims against
the bankrupt's estate are afforded priority over payments to creditors.'
The first such priority is given to those items labeled "costs and expenses
of administration." 2 This category typically includes compensation for
the services of a receiver who is appointed by the court to manage the busi-
ness in the period between the filing of a petition under the act and the
eventual liquidation of the bankrupt's assets for the benefit of creditors.8
The issue in a recent case, In the Matter of 1.1. Knight Realty Corp.,4 was
whether damages caused by the negligent tort of such a receiver fall under
the rubric of "costs and expenses of administration."
On November 16, 1962, I.J. Knight Realty Corporation filed a peti-
tion for arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act5 and a
receiver was appointed. On January 1, 1963, a fire, allegedly caused by
the negligence of the receiver's agent in repairing pipes in a building owned
by Knight caused severe damage to the Reading Railroad's neighboring
property. The railroad filed a claim for damages under section 64(a) (1)
of the Bankruptcy Act, styling this claim as a cost and expense of admin-
istration. In May, 1963, Knight Realty was formally adjudicated a bank-
rupt, and the former receiver was named trustee. He then successfully
petitioned the referee in bankruptcy to expunge Reading's claim. On
appeal, the district court held that the referee had correctly expunged the
claim on the ground that tort damages were not costs and expenses of
administration. The court further held that Reading could not be afforded
a pro rata share of the assets under section 63(a) (7) 6 since this section
allows, as a provable debt, only damages for negligent torts committed by
the bankrupt, and then only if an action has been instituted prior to and
was pending at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.7 The
holding of the Knight case leaves the negligent tort victim with no prac-
tical redress for injuries inflicted by the actions of a receiver in bank-
1 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
2 Ibid.
3 See, e.g., Thomas Corp. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1955).
4 242 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
5 Unlike a formal bankruptcy proceeding, the Chapter XI arrangement does not
ordinarily envision the liquidation of the bankrupt's assets, as occurred here. Instead,
it provides a means whereby a corporation in financial difficulty may petition the
Bankruptcy Court to work out a rehabilitation program. Of course, in Knight the
fire which destroyed the insolvent's building effectively forced a termination of this
rehabilitation. The arrangement proceedings were officially dismissed on May 14,
1963, when Knight was adjudicated a bankrupt.
652 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §103(a)(7) (1964).
7 242 F. Supp. at 342.
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ruptcy.8 Such a harsh result requires a closer scrutiny of section 64(a) (1)
than was made in the court's opinion.
The applicable provision of the act reads as follows:
§ 64. Debts Which Have Priority. (a) The debts to have prior-
ity, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to
be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment
shall be (1) the costs and expenses of administration, including
the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate subsequent to filing the petition . .. .9
Starting with the premise that statutes involving priorities are to be strictly
construed, 10 the court read the section as requiring that in order for this
claim to be a valid cost and expense of administration it must be one that
preserved the estate. The court reached the obvious conclusion that a fire
which decimated Knight's building certainly did not "preserve" the estate.
But, even ignoring the equally obvious argument that the fire which de-
stroyed property would not have occurred but for the acts of a repairman
whose job of fixing pipes was designed to preserve the estate, the court's
holding rests upon a shaky foundation: that Congress in drafting the act
intended to limit costs and expenses of administration to those listed items
8 Suing the receiver in his personal capacity also seems out of the question, the
general rule being that a receiver in bankruptcy faces personal liability for a negligent
tort only when he acts ultra vires. E.g., Ziegler v. Pitney, 139 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.
1943). "[R]eceivers and trustees appointed under the Bankruptcy Act . . . are by
the weight of authority only liable as receivers or trustees, and not individually except
in cases where they act outside their authority." Id. at 596; accord, Wood v. Comins,
303 Mass. 367, 21 N.E.2d 977 (1939); see McRanie v. Palmer, 2 F.R.D. 479 (D.
Mass. 1942); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891). In the McNulta case,
in holding a receiver liable in his official capacity for the negligent tort of a previous
receiver, the Supreme Court said:
Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership, or
the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeasances, negli-
gences and liabilities are official and not personal, and judgments against him
as receiver are payable only from the funds in his hands.
Id. at 332. (Emphasis added.) See also Rothschild, Liability Incurred by a Receiver
or Trustee in Bankruptcy Conducting a Business, 39 REF. J. 59, 62 (1965).
9 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1964).
10 In the Matter of I. J. Knight Realty Corp., 242 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Pa.
1965) (citing In the Matter of American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., 171
F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nor. American Anthracite & Bituminous
Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960)).
American Anthracite is distinguishable from Knight on the ground that "the
contracts which form the bases of the claim [in American Anthracite] were all
entered into long before the Chapter XI petition was filed." In the Matter of Ameri-
can Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., supra at 382. Unlike Knight, petitioners
in American Anthracite were pressing a § 64(a) (1) claim based upon a prebankruptcy
transaction. The dogma that priority statutes are to be strictly construed, while
clearly applicable to cases such as American Anthracite, has considerably less impact
when the claim is admittedly based upon the postbankruptcy actions of the receiver
as in Knight. American Anthracite really stands for the proposition that § 64(a) (1)
contemplates only those claims based upon costs and expenses incurred while the
estate is bankrupt or operating under a Chapter XI arrangement. See note 20 infra
and accompanying text.
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following the word "including." 11 Legislative history demonstrates that
the term "costs and expenses of administration" is not so limited.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 costs and expenses of administra-
tion were afforded a lower priority than the costs of "preserving the
estate." 12 In the 1938 version of the act these two items were given
identical priorities; but they remained separate claims, as the language of
that section clearly indicated.' 3 In 1962 section 64(a) (1) was amended
to its present form.14 However, the raising of "costs and expenses of
administration" to its position as the opening language of subsection 1,
and the insertion of "actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate" after "including," would not seem to change the long estab-
lished meanings of the two phrases-meanings far different from the abso-
lute merger envisioned by the court in Knight. In 1952 a proviso was
added to section 64(a) (1), stating that costs and expenses of administra-
tion incurred in an ensuing bankruptcy proceeding were to enjoy a super
priority over any costs and expenses of administration incurred as part of
the superseded proceeding. That is, the costs of winding up the business
were to have a priority over those incurred before liquidation.15 Unfor-
tunately, the wording of Section 64(a) (1) left it unclear whether this
super priority was to apply to all items in subsection one, or just to the
one specifically labeled "costs and expenses of administration." As the
Senate committee report on the 1962 amendment points out,
""Since this claim is not 'an actual and necessary cost and expense of preserving
the estate,' there is no specific authority for paying this claim." 242 F. Supp. at 339.
12 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563:
DEBTs WHIcH HAvE PRORITy.-a. The court shall order the trustee to pay
all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt . . .
b. The debts to have priority . . . and the order of payment shall be (1) the
actual and necessary cost of preserving the estate . . . ; (2) the filing fees
paid by creditors in involuntary cases; (3) the cost of administration . . . ;
(4) wages due to workmen . . . ; (5) debts owing to any person who by
the laws of the States or the United States is entitled to priority.
(Emphasis added.)
13 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act) ch. 575, § 64(a)(1), 52 Stat. 874:
Dmrs WHICH HAvE PRioRrr'.-a. The debts to have priority . . . and the
order of payment shall be (1) the actual and necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate . . . ; filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary
cases; where property of the bankrupt transferred or concealed by him . . .
shall have been recovered for the benefit of the estate . . . at the cost and
expense of . . . creditors, the reasonable costs and expenses of such recovery;
the costs and expenses of administration . . . ; (2) wages . . . ; (4) taxes
(Emphasis added.)
14 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
15 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act) §64(a) (1), as amended, ch. 579,
§19, 66 Stat. 426 (1952), as amended. The proviso stated:
Provided, however, That where an order is entered in a proceeding under any
chapter of this Act directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with, the costs and
expenses of administration incurred in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding
shall have priority in advance of payment of the unpaid costs and expenses
of administration . . . incurred in the superseded proceeding and in the
suspended bankruptcy proceeding, if any . ...
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all of the items set forth in section 64a(1) are properly regarded
as "costs and expenses of administration." Even as clause (1)
read in the Chandler Act amendment of section 64, however, the
quoted expression did not appear in the language of the clause
until three separate items were mentioned.16
The new language, as the report goes on to say, was designed to make it
clear that the 1952 super priority was to apply to all items in subdivision
1 of the 1938 act-hence the new form, using the word "including."
To say that all the items in section 64(a) (1) are costs and expenses of
administration is clearly not to say that a valid cost and expense must be
one that preserves the estate.
Nor does the case law cited by the Knight court strengthen its reading.
The court placed strong emphasis upon some language of In the Matter
of Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc.17 There the issue was the status, in the
order of priorities, to be given a government claim for unpaid taxes owed
on wages that were earned prior to bankruptcy, but which were paid to
the employees during bankruptcy. The relevant language quoted in Knight
was:
[I]t is preferable to isolate from Section 64, sub. a(1), as falling
without a meaningful view of costs and expenses of administration,
those expenses which, though they can be considered post-bank-
ruptcy items, are unrelated to development, preservation or dis-
tribution of the bankrupt's assets.1 s
Standing by itself, this language appears to support the Knight result; but
viewed in context with the rest of the Connecticut Motor Lines opinion, it
can hardly be read to mean that all valid section 64(a) (1) costs and
expenses of administration must be ones that preserve the estate. In
Connecticut Motor Lines the question was not whether the taxes were to
be given any section 64(a) priority, but merely whether they should be
given first priority as a cost of administration, instead of being relegated
to section 64(a) (4), which specifically provides for "taxes legally due and
owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any State or any subdivi-
sion thereof." 19 The Connecticut Motor Lines court pointed out that in
fact the taxes given section 64(a) (1) priority were traditionally those
which further maintained the bankrupt's assets. That is, they were in-
curred by reason of the receiver's postbankruptcy activities, not the mere
postbankruptcy payment of prebankruptcy obligations.2 0 All that the
16S. REP. No. 1954, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962), in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2607 (1962).
17 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964).1 8 In the Matter of I. J. Knight Realty Corp., 242 F.Supp. 337, 340-41 (E.D.
Pa. 1965), quoting In the Matter of Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102(3d Cir. 1964). (Emphasis supplied by the Knight court.)
19 52 Stat 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1964).
20 In all the cases cited, the trustee or bankrupt was taxed on activities in-
volved in further developing the bankrupt's assets or in seeking to maintain
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Connecticut Motor Lines court really meant by the passage quoted in
Knight was that while an expense might be "postbankruptcy" in the sense
that it was paid by the receiver, it would have had to stem from an activity
arising during bankruptcy in order to be a section 64(a) (1) item.
Another qualification placed by Knight upon the meaning of "costs
and expenses of administration," and one which also tends to exclude tort
claims, is that "Congress made clear that administrative expenses to be
given priorities were those that would prevent a 'breakdown of admin-
istration.' "21 The "breakdown" argument also rests upon words taken
out of context: The quoted words are part of the House report on the 1952
super priority amendment. When read along with the rest of the report,
these words mean nothing more than that a breakdown of administration
would occur if a super priority were not given to the claims of the ensuing
bankruptcy over those of superseded proceedings.P The report says noth-
ing about the general scope of the claims themselves 2 3
Even after the term "costs and expenses of administration" has been
stripped of those qualifications placed upon it by Knight, there remains
one problem. Assuming that Congress intended to allow, as valid section
64(a) (1) items, certain costs and expenses of administration that did not
fall within the specific enumerations following "including," is the Knight
tort claim one of these allowable items?
The Bankruptcy Act, according to Professor Collier, views tort claims
as administrative expenditures.2 The act
empowers the court to authorize the business of bankrupts to be
conducted for a limited period by a marshal, receiver or trustee.23
Among other expenses incident to conducting a business and
therefore allowable as administrative expenditure may be . . .
such assets for the maximum benefit of creditors. Post-bankruptcy taxation
such as this has long been viewed by the courts as part of classic administra-
tion expenses.
336 F.2d at 99. (Emphasis added.)
21242 F. Supp. at 340.
2 2 See text accompanying note 15 sutpra.
2 3H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1952), in 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1969 (1952):
Unless provision is made for payment, ahead of all prior incurred and unpaid
administration costs and expenses of the costs and expenses necessary to
liquidate, administer and close the estate in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding,
there is always danger of a breakdown of administration.
(Emphasis added.)
24judge Learned Hand's dictum in Vass v. Conron Bros., 59 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1932), gives a similar reading to the Bankruptcy Act. In this action against a trustee
in bankruptcy in his personal capacity, plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to
perform covenants in a lease between the bankrupt and the plaintiff although the
trustee had assumed these covenants. As a result plaintiff's goods were spoiled by
lack of refrigeration. In holding that the trustee could be sued only in his official
capacity, and thereby dismissing the action, judge Hand remarked that the "liquidation
of the lessee's resulting damages was as much a part of the usual administration in
bankruptcy, as that of the pay of accountants, custodians or other assistants, em-
ployed by the trustee." Id. at 971.
25 3 CoL.rm, BAxxic trrcy 1537 (14th ed. 1941).
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payments on claims for personal injuries inflicted in the operation
of a business .... 26
Moreover, there is strong authority for the proposition that torts com-
mitted by receivers in nonbankruptcy situations are properly costs of ad-
ministration.2 7 Clark on Receivers states:
When a receiver is appointed to operate a business he may as re-
ceiver [i.e., in his official capacity] be guilty of tort. .... 28
Damages resulting from the operation of the plant or business
being incidental to the management generally become part of the
expense of administration by the court.29
The policy behind such a rule seems sound. A receiver is appointed for the
benefit of creditors, it being generally felt that the owner of a bankrupt
business or of mortgaged property in a foreclosure action might lack the
incentive necessary to manage his business properly. Since the creditors
reap the benefits of the receiver's actions, their claims should be subordi-
nated to the damages flowing from that receiver's mismanagement.30
Although there are no cases directly on point a revealing analogy may
be drawn from those suits involving patent infringements by bankruptcy
receivers and trustees. In both Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp.31
and In re Paramount Publiz Corp.,3 2 it was held that a patent infringe-
ment committed by the bankrupt himself was not a provable expense under
section 63 (a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act.P Since this subsection involves
contracts, and since the court considered patent infringement to be a tort,
the claim would, if provable, have had to fall within section 63 (a) (7) of
the act. However, the tort claims in that section are limited to negligence
2 6 Id. at 1540.
2 7 See, e.g., Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360 (1908) (dealing with
receivers in mortgage foreclosure proceedings) ; McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327,
332 (1891) (same); Betts v. Bisher, 213 Fed. 581 (9th Cir. 1914) (same).
28 2 CLARK, RxcEivERs § 396(h), at 682 (3d ed. 1959).
29Id. at 683.
30 Some relief is afforded creditors, although not to the receiver's tort victim,
by reason of the receiver's bond, required under § 50 of the Bankruptcy Act. 52
Stat. 683 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 78 (1964). The purpose of this bond is to insure faithful
management of the bankrupt's assets for the benefit of creditors. Since mere negli-
gence on the part of the receiver is enough to sustain recovery on the bond, United
States v. Perkins, 280 Fed. 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1922), there can be little doubt that
the negligence of the receiver in Knight (which could result in total depletion of the
bankrupt's assets to pay tort damages) is sufficient to allow a creditors' suit upon the
bond. Albeit the relief to Knight's creditors would probably be insignificant-the
Knight fire was recognized as the largest in Philadelphia's history-in cases of less
severe torts the bond could provide a fairly adequate cushion.
38 188 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
82 8 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
8352 Stat. 873 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (4) (1964): "Debts of
the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded upon
(4) an open account, or a contract express or implied . .. .
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actions onlyY4 But, when a patent infringement was committed by the
trustee in bankruptcy, In re Progress Lektro Shave Corp. 5 allowed the
tort claim as a cost of administration. In distinguishing Paramount Pub-
lix, the Progress court focused directly on the fact that its case involved a
trustee's tort, not that of a bankrupt 3 6
Comparing the patent cases with the Knight holding reveals a substan-
tial inconsistency. Had the Knight tort been committed by the bankrupt
it would, being a negligent tort, clearly have been provable under section
63 (a) (7) so long as the action was instituted prior to the bankrupt's peti-
tion. Yet when committed by the receiver it was disallowed. On the
other hand, the patent cases show that a tort committed by the bankrupt,
which is not provable under section 63(a) (7), suddenly becomes a valid
claim simply because it was the fault of the trustee.
Knight attempts to distinguish the patent cases on the ground that
while infringements are torts, recovery is based on a theory of unjust
enrichment.3 7 The court reasoned that by infringing the patent the trustee
in Progress Lektro Shave was attempting to increase the assets of the busi-
ness, and that therefore the damages flowing from his failure to do so
successfully constituted a cost of administration within the "preservation"
subsection. This distinction, however, is subject to serious attack.
In deciding that patent infringement torts are designed to preserve
the estate, the Knight court looked to the reason behind their commission,
not to the results. Of course a receiver is attempting to preserve assets
when he sells patented articles without a license. But the result of his
34As to why § 63(a) (7) is limited to negligence actions, the fact situation in
Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp., 188 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), indirectly
supplies one answer. In that case the patentee did not file a claim against the bank-
rupt estate under § 63(a), but instead commenced suit after the defendant's discharge
in bankruptcy. The defendant was the party who argued that the patent claim was
a valid § 63(a) item. By proving this he hoped to show that by not putting in a
claim for damages under § 63(a) plaintiff had forfeited his right to proceed against
the bankrupt after the discharge. As authority for this proposition defendant cited
§ 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 74 Stat. 409 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964), which states
that a discharge shall release the bankrupt from all provable debts except those
contained in the subsections. Plaintiff, of course, argued that the claim was not
a § 63(a) item and, in the alternative, that even if it were it fell within § 17(a) (2)
of the Bankruptcy Act which states, inter alia, that claims for "willful and malicious
injuries to the person or property" are not dischargeable.
It thus appears that § 63(a) (7) is limited to negligence actions so that the victim
of a willful injury, his claim not discharged by bankruptcy, may proceed directly
against the infringer without resort to the Bankruptcy Court. The Goldsmith court,
since it held that a patent claim was not provable under § 63(a) and, on that ground
alone, not discharged, never faced the issue of whether a patent infringement was a
valid § 17(a)(2) item as well. Of course, the exclusion from §63(a) of patent
claims, while it does afford the patentee extrabankruptcy relief, in reality works a
substantial hardship on him since he cannot secure compensation from the estate,
a fund which very likely, except in cases like Goldsmith itself, will be his only practical
source of reimbursement One other possible reason for such a result is the fear of
spurious "willful torts" by the bankrupt against a cooperative "victim," designed to
defraud legitimate creditors.
3535 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1940).
s6Id. at 916. A similar claim was allowed earlier, even when § 63(a) permitted
no tort claims against the bankrupt to be proved. In re Michigan Motor Specialties
Co., 288 Fed. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1923).
37 242 F. Supp. at 343.
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failure to escape liability is a depletion of the bankrupt's assets in the form
of damages. Money flowing from the estate to pay damages for patent
infringement certainly does no more to preserve the assets than money
flowing from it to pay damages caused by a fire. Of course the analogy
between patent infringements and negligent torts would be weakened if
patent damages were limited to the money unjustly retained by the in-
fringer; but such is not the case. In fact, unpaid royalties are the minimum
damages3 The infringer may also be liable for the patentee's lost profits.39
As the court in Progress Lektro Shave pointed out, the patentee was "en-
titled to recover both damages and loss of profits." 40 Clearly, the court
considered plaintiff's recovery as measuring more than defendant's unjust
enrichment. The patentee's loss, not the infringer's gain, was determi-
native.41  In fact, the patent statute even allows treble damages in the
court's discretion.4
Reduced to its essence, the theory in the patent cases is nothing more
than a variation of the unsuccessful argument advanced by the railroad in
Knight that the repairing of the pipes, an act done to preserve the estate,
was a sine qua non of the fire.4 This similarity becomes all the more
obvious in the hypothetical case where a fire caused by the negligence of
the receiver stems from his desire to save money for the estate by taking
inadequate safety precautions. This hardly differs from an unsuccessfil
patent infringement designed to cut costs. To be consistent therefore, the
Knight court should have rejected the unjust enrichment distinction be-
tween patent torts and negligence torts. Of course to do this would be to
admit of no distinction between infringement torts and negligence torts
for purposes of section 64(a) (1). This admission in turn would have
placed the court in the curious position of recognizing the validity of a
claim for patent infringement by a trustee when the same claim could not
have been allowed under section 63(a) had it been the result of the bank-
rupt's act, while denying Reading's tort claim which clearly would have
been valid under section 63(a) (7) had the bankrupt caused the fire.
General policy also calls for a reversal of the Knight decision. It is
of course true that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ensure
38 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964) :
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, to-
gether with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.
39 E.g., Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471-72 (5th
Cir. 1958).
40 In re Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 35 F. Supp. 915, 916 (D. Conn. 1940).
41 "Holding, as I do, that upon the facts as found by the referee the sale by the
trustee was in violation of the claimant's rights, it follows that the claim must be
allowed as an expense of administration." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
42 See note 38 supra.
4 3 In the Matter of I. J. Knight Realty Corp., 242 F. Supp. 337, 341 (1965).
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an equitable distribution of assets among the bankrupt's creditors. But,
at the same time, any rule of law which results in virtual immunity from
tort liability for businesses in receivership may lead to a result the harsh-
ness of which can far outstrip the equities in favor of creditors. Receivers
are appointed to compensate for the probable lack of diligence that would
befall the management of a business if left in the hands of the bankrupt.
Certainly the court should not then permit an unremediable lack of due
care on the part of the receiver himself; as between creditors and tort vic-
tims the former have considerable control over the receiver's actions, the
latter absolutely none.
When it is considered that a receivership often continues for years
solely in the hope that creditors may be able to recoup a larger percentage
of their outstanding debts when liquidation is finally begun, it hardly
seems fair to allow the man who is acting for the benefit of creditors to
ignore all standards of reasonable care in an attempt to squeeze more money
from the bankrupt estate. Personal injuries suffered by the receiver's
own employees have been held compensable as costs of administration. 45
It seems even more imperative that innocent tort victims should have a
similar remedy. To deny this remedy as the Knight court has done is to
allow bankrupt businesses in receivership to become public nuisances with-
out fear of liability.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959);
Standard Oil Co. v. Kurtz, 330 F2d 178 (8th Cir. 1964).
45 Matter of Bloom, 28 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 570 (Referee, E.D. Ark. 1935).
